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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
NADF.EM M. MUNA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 16643 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff and respondent, Microbiological Research 
Corporation, commenced an action in Septe~~er of 1978 seeking 
to restrain defendant and appellant from competing with it 
in the manufacture and sale of diagnostic test kits, from 
using respondent's alleged trade secrets and from soliciting 
respondent's customers. 
DISPOSITION BY THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT 
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The Honorable J. Duffy Palmer entered an Order 
awarding respondent an injunction on the 19th day of 
November, 1979. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests that the injunction 
awarded to respondent by the Second Judicial District Court 
be set aside. 
FACTS 
Appellant, Nadeem M. Muna, received his Bachelor's 
Degree in Chemistry in 1951, a Master's Degree in 1954 in 
Biochemistry and Microbiology, and in 1968 was awarded his 
Ph.D. in Immunology and Microbiology (T. 129). From 1956 until 
1968, while at U.C.L.A. and the Thomas Dee Hospital in Ogden, 
Utah, he worked with the imrnunofluorescence technique of 
tracing diseases (T. 199). In 1966 appellant published a 
paper in the American Journal of Clinical Pathology describing 
a procedure he, along with two other scientists, had 
developed to test patients for lupus erythematosis. The 
paper lists the equipment required as well as a step by step 
procedure for using imrnunofluorescence to perform an anti-
nuclear antibody test (ANA) (T. 199 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 
21). FL, HeLa and kidney cells were used by the appellant 
in making the slides for the test and these slides could be 
stored indefinitely until needed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 21 at 
118). Appellant had good results from these slides five 
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years after they were made (T. 200). 
Appellant spent two years at U.C.L.A. (1956 and 
1957) where he developed an immunofluorescence test for 
Herpes virus (T. 211). He completed his Ph.D. studies in 
1968 at the University of Utah where he participated in 
programs dealing with the growth of large batches of tissue 
culture cells. While at the University of Utah appellant 
and a number of his classmates and associates used flat 
Pyrex plates covered with Saran wrap to hold the tissue 
culture cells while they were propagating (T. 214). 
During the fifteen years prior to 1968 appellant 
used many diverse cell lines, including the FL cells, to 
detect the presence of ANA and Herpes in a human patient 
(T. 200, 211). Appellant used isopropyl alcohol, ether 
and methanol to "fix" the cells during this time (T. 201, 227), 
and employed saline as a rinse in producing his early test 
kits (T. 200). 
In 1968 appellant met Edward J. Mawod, a stock 
broker (T. 130). Appellant described to Mr. Mawod a research 
project which he was conducting which hopefully would 
result in a new method to detect cancer. Mr. Mawod then 
introduced appellant to three other gentlemen who agreed to 
raise capital to develop and market a cancer detection kit 
(T. 130). Microbiological Sciences, Inc. was incorporated, 
a lab was built and appellant was elected corporate president 
-3-
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and employed as its general manager. On September 4, 1968 
appellant and respondent entered into a Management Contract 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 22) and the development of a cancer 
detection kit was commenced. Microbiological Sciences, Inc. 
transferred its stock to a "shell" corporation shortly 
after it was organized and after another stock transfer and 
name change, it became Microbiological Research Corporation 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "IV'..RC") , the respondent 
in this action. In May of 1969, respondent ran out of funds 
and was unable to purchase tumors necessary to the development 
of the cancer detection kit (Deposition of Nadeem M. Muna at 
7-8). 
Appellant advised respondent's board of directors 
that he felt that the commercial production of an ANA test 
kit was possible using the company's existing lab. Production 
and sale of the ANA kit commenced in September of 1969 (T. 135). 
In 1972 respondent began marketing a toxoplasmosis 
test kit and in 1976, sale of a Herpes detection kit began 
(~. 135, 207}. The Herpes kit is an immunofluorescence kit 
produced by using the same basic procedure as is used in 
making the ANA kit (T. 100). The toxoplasmosis kit is 
manufactured by respondent according to the procedures outlined 
in a manual published by the Center for Disease Control (T. 
215-16). The only variation employed by respondent is the 
use of an ingredient called "Tween 80", which is also used 
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by Dr. Jack Remmington, a California microbiologist who 
specializes in toxoplasmosis. The Hoffman-LeRoach company, 
one of respondent's competitors, also utilizes Tween 80 
(T. 216). 
In 1970 respondent developed its own cell line 
and began using it in its test kits instead of cell lines 
named "FL" and "AV-3" (T. 203). From 1970 through 1974 
appellant, on respondent's behalf, wrote several letters as 
well as a published article aimed at customers and potential 
customers. These documents claimed that respondent's test 
kits were superior because they utilized respondent's own 
special cell line (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 5 and 15). In 
1974, however, one of respondent's technicians caused the 
loss of thio special cell line and respondent conunenced 
using FL and AV-3 lines (T. 203, 205-06). The basis of the 
"sales pitch" contained in these documents was thus eliminated 
and different marketing methods were required. 
On August 14, 1972 respondent entered into an 
exclusive distributorship agreement with Smith-Kline 
Instruments, a California company. This agreement granted 
Smith-Kline the exclusive right to distribute respondent's 
ANA and Toxoplasmosis kits as well as any other products 
which respondent manufactured during the term of the 
agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). While this agreement was 
in effect, technical employees of Smith-Kline Instruments 
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worked in respondent's lab and assisted in the production of 
respondent's kits (Deposition of Nadeem M. Muna at 18). In 
December of 1975 Smith-Kline Instruments terminated its 
distributorship relationship with respondent and began selling 
its own ANA kit (_T. 182, Deposition of Nadeem M. Muna at 15, 24). 
Respondent has several competitors who manufacture and market 
ANA Immunofluorescence, Herpes Immunofluorescence and 
Toxoplasmosis kits (T. 217, 218, 236, 238). 
Appellant served as respondent's corporate president 
until February, 1978, when Mr. Mawod won the office in a 
shareholder's election (T. 4, 5). This election was preceded 
by a "proxy fight", and on January 24, 1978 appellant wrote 
a letter to all of the sha.reholders advising them that if he 
lost the election, he intended to quit working for respondent 
and start a competing business (Defendant's E}chibi t 1) • Mr. 
Mawed read this letter prior to the election (T. 63). 
On February 28, 1978, after the shareholder's 
election, appellant and respondent entered into an Employment 
Agreement (Appendix "A"}. This agreement purported to 
employ appellant as a consultant, research microbiologist 
and director of labs for respondent. Appellant continued to 
work in this capacity until on or about July 30, 1978, when 
Mr. Mawod, on respondent's behalf, terminated appellant's 
employment (T. 31}. 
Appellant then began preparing to manufacture 
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products similar to those sold by respondent. On September 
28, 1979, respondent commenced this action and appellant 
has been judicially restrained from competing with respondent 
since that date. Prior to the trial of this case, appellant 
had petitioned the trial court for an order requiring that 
respondent post a bond pending the trial on the merits. This 
bond, which would have provided some protection for appellant 
in the event that respondent's case was found to be without 
merit, was denied by the trial court and the case progressed 
to its present posture before this Court. 
SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN 
MANUFACTURING ANA, HERPES AND TOXOPLASMOSIS 
TEST KITS. 
Due to the complex and technical nature of the manu-
facturing processes which are the subject of the instant case, 
it is felt that a brief explanation would assist the Court 
in better understanding the issues. The following is extracted 
from the testimony of two of respondent's witnesses, Carol 
Golden, Ph.D., and Albert Leibovitz, as well as appellant's 
testimony and references to the record have been omitted. 
ANA Test Kit 
This kit is used by various laboratories and hospitals 
to test for the presence of anti-nuclear antibodies in a 
patient. When a patient's test reads positive, it is an 
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indication that he has lupus erythematosus. 
In order to manufacture the kit the respondent 
propagates a number of FL or AV-3 human amnion cells in a growth 
media. The basic Minimum Essential Media is purchased from a 
commercial supplier and respondent adds certain other nutrients. 
Glass slides, each having eight wells, are placed in 
a Pyrex baking dish and covered with the cells. The baking 
dish is covered with Saran wrap and the cells are allowed to 
grow until one layer covers the baking dish. The growth media 
is removed and the slides are washed to remove unwanted matter 
with a phosphate buffered saline solution. 
The cells remaining on the wells of each slide are 
fixed (the growth is stopped) using isopropyl alcohol, and 
the slides are placed in a buffer and glycerine solution to 
preserve them. Respondent provides Antihuman Globulin which 
has a fluorescein additive with each test kit. 
The laboratory places the Antihuman Globulin on the 
wells of the slide and a sample patient's blood is also 
placed on the we11: Each of the eight wells of the slide can 
be used to test individual patients. The slide is placed 
under a fluorescence microscope and if a greenish-yellow 
fluorescent color appears, the test is positive. 
Herpes Test Kit 
The Herpes 1 and 2 test kits are manufactured and 
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used in virtually the same manner except that Herpes virus 
is added to the slides in place of the Antihuman Globulin. 
The respondent purchases its Herpes virus from the University 
of Utah. 
Toxoplasmosis Test Kit 
This test does not employ the use of tissue culture 
techniques. A known parasite toxoplasmosis strain is inserted 
into a living mouse's belly and when the mouse becomes inactive 
and has ruffled fur the toxoplasmosis cells are removed. 
These cells are placed on slides and killed with formaldehyde. 
The slides are used by the laboratories and hospitals in much 
the same manner as the two previously discussed tests. 
-9-
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' ~ 
POINT I 
THE l.978 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT SUPERSEDED 
THE 1968 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT k~D BECAME 
THE SOLE BINDING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
A. THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE 1978 
AGREEMENT EXPRESSLY TERMINATED ALL PRIOR 
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS. 
An elementary principle of law allows that parties 
to a contract may, by means of a new contract, put an end to 
their old bargain and strike a new one; or, as stated in l7A 
C.J.S., Contracts, sec. 394: "As a contract is the result of 
agreement, so an agreement may put an end to a contract." 
Paragraph l of the 1978 employment agreement states: 
"All previous employment agreements and understandings in 
connection therewith are hereby mutually terminated and settled." 
(Emphasis added.) (Appendix "A" at 1). A more succinct statement 
of the intent of the parties regarding this point would be 
difficult to draft. The Utah Supreme Court has set forth a 
clear guideline for discerning the intentions of the parties 
to a contract: 
Elementary~it 0 is that in construing 
contracts we seek to determine the intentions 
of the parties. But it is also elementary 
and of extreme practical importance that we 
hold contracting parties to their clear and 
understandable language deliberately 
committed to writing and endorsed by them 
as signatories thereto. Were this not so 
business, one with another among our citizens, 
would be relegated to the chaotic, and the 
basic purpose of the law to supply enforceable 
-10-
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rules of conduct for the maintenance and 
improvement of an orderly society's 
welfare and progress wo~ld find itself 
impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold 
one responsible for language which he 
himself espouses. Such language is the 
only implement he gives us to fashion a 
determination as to the intentions of 
the parties. Under such circumstances, 
we should not be required to embosom 
any request that we ignore that very 
language. This is as it should be. The 
rule excluding matters outside the four 
corners of a clear, understandable 
document, is a fair one, and one's 
contentions concerning his intent should 
extend no further than his own clear 
expressions. 
Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah2d 276, 323 P.2d 259, 260-
261 (1958). See also: Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 
(Utah 1977). 
Language of a comparably express tenor was given 
such a strict interpretation in Burns v. Reliance Life Ins. 
co. of Pittsburgh, 122 W.Va. 708, 12 S.E.2d 509 (1941), a 
case involving employment contracts signed in 1924 and 1935 
which were asserted to terminate and supersede an employment 
contract signed in 1915. Both the 1924 and 1935 contracts 
contained essentially the following language: 
This agreement shall take effect on the 
20th day of February, 1924, and all previous 
communications between the parties hereto, 
verbal or written, are hereby abrogated and 
withdrawn, and this agreement, when duly 
signed and approved, constitutes the 
agreement between the parties hereto, and 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no modification of this accepted agreement 
shall be binding upon the parties hereto, 
or either of them, unless in writing 
hereon duly accepted by the second party 
and approved by the proper officers of 
the first party. Id. at 510. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held the above-
quoted language to be sufficient to effect a termination of 
the 1915 contract. Appellant contends that the express 
language of paragraph 1 of the 1978 employment agreement 
in the instant case is even more explicit than that at issue 
in Bi.1rns, supra. 
Respondent is likely to argue that, despite the 
express language, it could not have intended to substitute 
the 1978 agreement for the 1968 agreement be~ause it contends 
that it had no knowledge of the 1968 agreement. In Fogdall v. 
Lewis & Clark College, 590 P.2d 775 (Or.App. 1979), facial 
inconsistencies between two contracts of employment were found 
to be sufficient evidence of intent for the later agreement to 
supersede the prior agreement. The court also stated, "The 
law of contracts is not concerned with parties' undisclosed 
intents and ideas. It gives heed only to their communications 
and overt acts." Id. at 780. Appellant maintains that the 
facial inconsistencies between the contracts at issue in the 
instant case are sufficient evidence of respondent's intent. 
This Court should find that paragraph 1 of the 1978 employment 
agreement terminated the 1968 employment agreement and thus 
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conclude that the 1978 agreement superseded the 1968 agreement 
and became a substitute therefor. 
A second principle of contract interpretation is 
equally supportive of appellant's theory of substitution of 
contracts: a contract drawn up by a party's attorney must 
be strictly construed against that party. Guinand v. Walton, 
22 Utah2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 (1969). See also: Wingets, Inc. 
v. Bitters, 28 Utah2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Skousen v. 
Smith, 27 Utah2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972). In the instant 
case, the 1978 agreement having been drawn up by respondent's 
attorney (T. 19), it must be strictly construed against 
respondent. If the language of paragraph 1 of the 1978 
agreement is to be given the force and binding effect dictated 
by Utah case law, the 1978 agreement must be interpreted as 
terminating the 1968 agreement and operating as the sole 
binding contract between the parties. 
B. THE 1978 AGREEMENT BECAME A SUBSTITUTED 
CONTRACT FOR THE 1968 AGREEMENT BY OPERATION 
OF LAW. 
In 17A C.J.S., Contracts, sec. 395, it is stated 
that: "A contract complete in itself will be conclusively 
presumed to supersede and discharge another one made prior 
thereto between the same parties concerning the same subject 
matter, where the terms of the latter are inconsistent with 
those of the former so that they cannot subsist together." 
(Emphasis added.) This maxim has received a strong 
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endorsement from the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Goings v. 
Gerken, 200 Neb. 247, 263 N.W.2d 655 (1978), wherein the 
court quoted the language of In re Estate of Wise, 144 Neb. 
273, 13 N.W.2d 146 (1944): "A contract complete in itself 
will be conclusively presumed to supersede and discharge 
another one made prior thereto between the same parties 
concerning the same subject matter, where terms of the later 
are inconsistent with those of the former so that they cannot 
subsist together." 263 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Emphasis added.) 
The notion that a subsequent contract may be 
substituted for a prior contract between the same parties is 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Hanover Limited v. 
Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977). In Hanover Limited, a later 
earnest money agreement which was "complete on its face and 
contained no ambiguities" was found to have be.en substituted 
for a prior real estate contract. Id. at 753. Appellant 
contends that the court's logic in Hanover is applicable with 
equal force in the case of two employment contracts. 
Appellant's theory on thi.s point is supported by 
the findings of the Court of Appeals for the Six:th Circuit 
in Decca Records v. Republic Recording Company, 235 F.2d 360 
(6th Cir. 1956). In Decca Records, a pianist had signed an 
employment agreement on an unspecified date prior to 1952 
with Tennessee Records. On February 9, 1953, the pianist, 
Del Wood, signed a new employment contract with Republic 
Recording Company. (In Decca Records, Republic Recording 
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Company was the successor to Tennessee Records, just as 
in the instant case where Microbiological Research Corporation 
was the successor to Microbiological Sciences, Inc.). In 
finding that the 1953 employment contract was a substituted 
contract for the prior employment agreement, the court stated, 
But the legal effect of the new contract 
afterward executed between Republic and 
Del Wood was to rescind and supersede 
the former contract executed between 
Tennessee and Del Wood, which had been 
assigned to Republic. A second contract 
of a later date that an earlier contract 
containing the same subject matter, but 
containing terms inconsistent with the 
former contract, will supersede the 
former contract even though there is no 
express agreement that the new contract 
shall have that effect. Id. at 363. 
(Citations omitted.) ~ 
The express termination clause in the 1978 agreement in the 
instant case has been previously emphasized by appellant. It 
should also be noted that the 1978 agreement contains terms 
pertaining to virtually every individual subject discussed in 
the 1968 agreement. 
In determining whether a new employment contract 
will be found to supersede a prior employment contract in the 
absence of express language to that effect, courts have often 
closely scrutinized the employee's position to see if there 
has been a change of circumstances. If a significant change 
of circumstances has occurred, the new employment contract 
is more likely to be deemed a substitute for the old one. 
-15-
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A change of circumstances has included such fact patterns as 
a termination and a rehiring, a change in offices, positions, 
titles or roles by the employee, changes in compensation, 
changes in duties, lapse of time, and various other factors. 
In the· following cases, the court placed great weight on whether 
a change in circumstances had occurred. 
In M. S. Jacobs and Associates, Inc. v. Duffley, 303 
A.2d 921 (Pa. 1973), a salesman signed an employment contract 
in 1968 which contained a covenant against competition. In 
1969, the employee tendered his resignation, but remained 
employed after receiving a raise. The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania found that no novation of the 1968 contract had 
occurred in 1969 because "the resignation was never accepted 
and •.. appellee's pay was never stopped." Id. at 923. 
In the instant case, respondent admits that appellant was 
"discharged" and subsequently entered into a "new employment 
agreement". (R. 132). Moreover, appellant's status changed 
from that of President and General Manager to Director of Labs 
and consultant, his salary went from $12,000 per year to 
$17.00 per hour, and appellant was no longer to be reimbursed 
for business expenses that he incurred. (Appendices "A" and 
"B"). These facts constitute a change in circumstances which 
was missing in M. S. Jacobs and Associates, Inc., supra. 
If the 1978 agreement is not found to ha.ve superseded 
the 1968 agreement in its entirety, the two agreements should 
at least be read together, with the inconsistent parts of 
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the 1978 contract superseding the prior 1968 conflicting 
provisions. Such an approach was utilized by the Supreme 
Court of North Dakota in Metcalf v. Security Intern. Ins. 
~· 261 N.W.2d 795 (N.D. 1977), wherein the court read 
employment contracts executed in 1963, 1967 and 1972 together, 
holding that later inconsistent provisions superseded prior 
clauses which were in conflict. In the instant case, the 
1978 and 1968 agreements are inconsistent in essentially 
three <.re as: (1) appellant's position, title and responsibilities; 
(2) compensation; and (3) the non-competition clauses. 
Specifically, these clauses read as follows: 
(1) appellant's position, title and responsibilities: 
1968 agreement 
Management Contract 
1. The Company hereby employs Muna as its 
President and General Manager for a period 
of five (5) years from the date hereof, 
and thereafter, from year to year, unless 
terminated by either party hereto by 
written notice at least sixty (60) days 
prior to any anniversary date of this 
Agreement. 
1978 agreement 
Employment Agreement 
3. Muna agrees to act as a consultant 
and research microbiologist for Micro upon 
such problems and projects as the management 
of Micro shall specify, and shall be 
Dir. of Labs (CDC). 
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4. 
When not engaged in consulting work, 
Muna shall pursue the designated research 
projects and shall devote as much time to 
said employment as his health permits, but 
not to exceed 40 hours per week, without 
prior written permission. 
(2) compensation: 
1968 agreement 
4. The Company shall pay Muna a basic 
salary of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000) 
per annum, payable in equal monthly 
installments, for all services rendered 
by Muna for the Company. The Company shall 
also reimburse Muna for all expenses 
incurred by him in the furtherance of the 
business of the Company, approved by the 
Board of Directors of the Company. 
1978 agreement 
4. Micro shall pay to Muna the sum of 
$17.00 per hour, payable semi-monthly, 
for such consulting and research work. 
(No provision was included for the 
reimbursement of expenses.) 
(3) non-competition clauses: 
1968 agreement 
6. Muna agrees that during the terms of 
this Agreement he will not engage in any 
other commercial activity in any way 
competitive with the business of the 
Company, or its affiliated companies, and 
that, for a period of five (5) years after 
leaving the employ of the Company, he will 
not engage in any way, directly or indirectly, 
in any business competitive with the Company 
or its affiliated companies any (sic) any 
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state in which any of them do business. 
Muna further agrees that he will not 
disclose to any other person any 
information which is the property of 
the Company or its affiliated companies. 
1978 agreement 
·6. During the term of this Agreement 
Muna shall not act as a consultant for, 
or accept employment from any competitor 
of Micro nor shall he compete directly 
or indirectly with Micro. 
(The term of the 1978 agreement was 
continuous with termination upon thirty 
days notice. ) 
Each clause recited above is so inconsistent with 
its counterpart in the opposite agreement that the clauses 
cannot be read together. The clauses from the 1978 agreement 
must be read as superseding those in the 1968 agreement. 
Appellant acknowledges that the intent of the 
parties is largely determinative of whether the clauses 
recited above from the 1978 agreement should supersede those 
from the 1968 agreement. As is stated in 15 WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS, THIRD EDITION SECTION 1826, p. 485-86: 
'A contract containing a term inconsistent 
with a term of an earlier contract between 
the same parties is interpreted as including 
an agreement to rescind the inconsistent 
term in the earlier contract. The parties 
may or may not at the same time agree to 
rescind all the other provisions of the 
erlier (sic) contract.' The extent of the 
substitution is a matter of their intent. 
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This Court has stated that a party's assent to 
a substituted contract may be shown by surrounding 
circumstances. Robison v. Hansen, 594 P.2d 867 (Utah 1979). 
In Robison, an assignor took possession of a car wash from 
his assignee in compromise of their prior agreement to have 
the assignee run the car wash. Justice Maughan, citing 
6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, sec. 1293, p. 197, endorsed the 
following principle: 
The substituted contract, whether of 
rescission or modification, may be 
expressed otherwise than in words. 
Such an implied, or inferred, agreement, 
found by interpretation of conduct 
instead of words, has the same legal 
operation as if it had been expressed 
in words. 594 P.2d 867, 870. 
Respondent will doubtless contend that it could 
not have intended the 1978 agreement to supersede the 1968 
agreement because respondent maintains that it was unaware of 
the 1968 agreement. Appellant asserts that the intent of the 
parties to substitute the 1978 agreement for the 1968 
agreement can be shown from the surrounding circumstances. 
In 1968, appellant was to be President and General Manager 
of respondent and signed an agreement entitled "Management 
ConLract". As the years passed, appellant became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the corporate operation, his dissatisfaction 
culiminating in a letter to the shareholders of respondent 
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expressing his intent to terminate his employment with 
respondent if appellant lost the upcoming "proxy fight". 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1) Appellant then suffered a serious 
heart attack which reduced his capacity to work on a full-
time basis. Appellant subsequently lost the "proxy fight" 
and w~s ousted from his management position. It was after 
all these occurrences that appellant and respondent entered 
into the 1978 "Employment Agreement". Such circumstances 
indicate that respondent must have intended the 1978 
agreement to supersede the 1968 agreement. 
Finally, two general principles concerning 
employment contracts must be emphasized. First, ambiguities 
in an employment contract must be construed most strongly 
against the employer who drafted the contract. National 
Cash Register Company v. Lightner, 154 Colo. 98, 388 P.2d 
781 (.1964). Second, covenants not to compete contained in 
a contract of employment are to be strictly construed 
against the employer. Eastern Distributing Co., Inc. v. 
Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977). Both of these 
concepts support a determination that the 1978 agreement 
superseded the 1968 agreement. 
In summary, appellant contends that the express 
language of the 1978 agreement terminated the 1968 agreement 
and therefore the 1978 agreement became the sole binding 
contract between the parties. If the Court should find 
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that there was no express termination, then the facial 
inconsistencies between the two agreements, the rules of 
strict contract interpretation and the policy of favoring 
the employee when dealing with a non-competition clause 
drafted by the employer, all support a finding that the 
1978 agreement superseded the 1968 agreement. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT DID NOT DELIBERATELY CONCEAL THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE 1968 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
NOR DID HE HAVE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
VOLUNTEER ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING ITS 
EXISTENCE OR CONTENTS. 
The finding of fact by the trial court that 
appellant deliberately concealed the existence of the 1968 
employment agreement is not supported by sufficient evidence. 
Appellant had no recollection of having signed the 1968 
agreement until it was shown to him by counsel for respondent 
at the hearing on appellant's motion for summary judgment. 
The trial transcript is devoid of sufficient evidence to 
form a substantial basis for respondent's claim that 
appellant deliberately concealed the existence of the 1968 
agreement. The trial court's finding that appellant 
deliberately concealed the agreement is, therefore, erroneous. 
This Court must correct an erroneous finding of fact by 
the trial court which is not supported by a substantial 
basis in the evidence. Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976). 
that, 
A. APPELLANT HAD NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
VOLUNTEER ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THE 
EXISTENCE OR CONTENTS OF THE 1968 AGREEMENT. 
In its conclusions of law, the trial court states 
Defendant had a fiduciary duty during the 
negotiations on his employment contract 
of February 28, 1978, to reveal to the 
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new officers of the plaintiff the existence 
and the terms and conditions of his employment 
contract of September 4, 1968, and that 
his concealment of that employment contract 
made a nullity of the employment contract 
of February 28, 1978. 
Appellant contends that the dramatic changes in 
his involvement with respondent which precipitated the 1978 
agreement destroyed any fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship he may have had with respondent as its former president. 
Specifically, appellant contends that the following 
circumstances removed any duty to volunteer information to 
respondent during contract negotiations in 1978: 
(1) On January 24, 1978, appellant sent a letter 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1) to the stockholders of respondent 
informing them of his discontent with the management of 
respondent and of his intent to resign and start a new 
business if Mr. Mawed should win the upcoming "proxy fight"; 
(2) Mr. Mawod did, in fact, win the "proxy fight" 
and appellant was ousted as president and general manager 
of respondent; 
(3) Appellant's personal differences and 
disagreements with Mr. Mawod, with whom appellant negotiated 
the 1978 agreement, were clear from the face of appellant's 
letter of January 28, 1978, and were known to Mr. Mawed 
prior to the negotiations of the 1978 agreement (T.63); 
(4) Appellant's status had, at the time of 
negotiations on the 1978 agreement, changed from that of 
full-time president and general manager with salary and 
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expense account to part-time hourly consultant with no 
official duties; 
(5) Mr. Mawed had maintained constant involvement 
with respondent from his activities as a promoter in 1968 
to president in 1978; 
(6) The negotiations for the 1978 agreement were 
carried on at arm's length. 
In Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364, 
49 P.2d 403 (1935), the Utah Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of scrutinizing the types of circumstances listed 
above when assessing whether a fiduciary duty existed: 
It is not every relationship to which 
the term "fiduciary" or "confidential" 
might be applied with some degree of 
reason or plausibility that will authorize, 
by itself alone, the creation of the 
presumption of fraud in the dealings 
between each other of those occupying 
that relationship. Every business 
transaction involves a certain amount 
of confidence and trust. Equity will 
not discourage transactions by creating 
presumptions of their fraudulent nature, 
except in those cases where the 
transactions occur between parties to 
relationships which by their very nature 
it is the policy of the law to protect 
one of the parties thereto on the theory 
that they are not dealing on an equal 
basis because of the confidence which 
one party to the relationship is 
presumed to have in the other. It 
is always a question, therefore, of 
the actual relationship between the 
parties that must be inquired into, 
and not whether the terms "fiduciary," 
"confidential," or "trust," can, with 
some degree of reason, be applied to 
the relationship. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 404. 
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Appellant maintains that his relationship with Mr. Mawed and 
his estrangement from respondent as a corporation prevented 
the imposition of a fiduciary duty. 
In Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 166 F.2d 651 (7th 
Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 813, Mr. Vargas had been 
working under the terms of an initial employment contract 
for some three years when a second employment contract was 
entered into. Vargas sought to avoid the second contract by 
claiming that his employer's agent had breached a fiduciary 
duty by failing to disclose the terms of the contract. 
Despite extensive business, personal and social involvement 
between Vargas and the agent, no fiduciary or confidential 
relationship was found. The court stated: 
The [fiduciary] relationship arises 
wherever the circumstances make it certain 
that confidence was reposed on one side 
and domination and influence resulted 
on the other. But where a fiduciary 
relationship does not exist as a matter 
of law, the burden of proving facts from 
which such a relationship arises is upon 
the person seeking to establish the 
relationship, and the proof must be 
clear, convincing, and so strong as to 
lead to but one possible conclusion. 
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 653. 
Because appellant's positions as president and general manager 
had been terminated and his dissatisfaction with the 
management of respondent was so well-known, a fiduciary 
relationship cannot be established as a matter of law; 
furthermore, appellant's relationship with Mr. Mawed and the 
circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the 1978 contract 
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prevent any finding of a fiduciary relationship resulting 
from confidence or trust. 
The significance of appellant's discharge as 
president and general manager of respondent is emphasized 
in 19 Am.Jur.2d, Corporation, Sec. 1273, p. 681: "After 
there has been a severance of official relationship, either 
because of resignation or removal, generally, a director or 
officer occupies no relation of trust or confidence to the 
corporation." In Renpak v. Oppenheimer, 104 So.2d 642 
(Fla.App. 1958), the rule is stated as, "After there has been 
a severance of official relation, either because of resignation 
or removal, the former director or officer may then deal with 
the corporation thereafter like any other stranger." Id. 
at 644. Appellant was entitled to deal with respondent as 
a stranger would have. 
The typical situation in which a failure to 
disclose certain facts is deemed a breach of a fiduciary 
relationship is found in Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 
384 P.2d 802 (1963), wherein a vendor failed to disclose a 
quarantine affecting the land sought by the purchaser. The 
court, quoting from 23 Am.Jur. 857, Fraud and Deceit, IV 
Concealment, Sec. BO, stated: 
"Knowledge that the other party to a 
contemplated transaction is acting under 
a mistaken belief as to certain facts 
is a factor in determining that a duty 
of disclosure is owing. There is much 
authority to the effect that if one party 
to a contract or transaction has superior 
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knowledge, or knowledge which is not 
within the fair and reasonable reach 
of the other party and which he could 
not discover by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, or means of 
knowledge which are not open to both 
parties alike, he is under a legal 
obligation to speak, and his silence 
constitutes fraud, especially when the 
other party relies upon him to com-
municate to him the true state of facts 
to enable him to judge of the 
expediency of the bargain." 384 P.2d 
at 805. 
Appellant did not possess superior knowledge 
which could not have been obtained by respondent through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence. A mere examination of the 
corporate files by Mr. Mawod would have revealed a copy of 
the contract. Nor did appellant occupy a position of trust or 
confidence with respect to respondent or respondent's agent 
which would give rise to a duty of disclosure. Most 
importantly, appellant occupied no formal position which 
would impose a duty of disclosure upon him by operation of 
law. Because no duty to speak existed, appellant's failure 
to recall the existence of the 1968 agreement and his 
resulting silence should not vitiate the 1978 agreement. 
B. RESPONDENT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE 1968 
AGREEMENT BECAUSE A CORPORATION IS CHARGED 
WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF ITS OFFICERS. 
The 1968 agreement was signed by appellant and 
attested by one Daniel E. King, secretary of respondent. 
While the signature of the vice-president of respondent does 
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not appear on any of the copies of the 1968 agreement given 
to appellant, respondent cannot deny that the agreement was 
signed by its vice-president since it is asserting the 
validity of the agreement. 
As stated in 3 Fletcher eye. Corp. (Perm Ed) 
Sec. 801, p. 38, 
Subject to certain qualifications and 
exceptions hereinafter noted, the general 
rule is well established that a corporation 
is charged with constructive knowledge, 
regardless of its actual knowledge, of all 
material facts of which its officer or agent 
receives notice or acquires knowledge 
while acting in the course of his employ-
ment within the scope of his authority, 
even though the officer or agent does not 
in fact communicate his knowledge to the 
corporation. The rule does not depend 
upon the fact that the agent has disclosed 
the knowledge or information to his 
principal, "subject to the exceptions 
named, the law conclusively presumes 
that he has done so, and charges the 
principal accordingly." In other 
words this rule rests upon the presumption 
that the agent will communicate to the 
corporation the facts learned by him, as 
it is his duty to it, and whether he 
performs such duty or not, the corporation 
is bound. So notice to an agent of a 
corporation relating to any matter of 
which he has the management and control 
is notice to the corporation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the principle of imputing 
knowledge to a corporation through the knowledge of its 
officers in Lowe v. April Industries, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 
(Utah 1974). Moreover, as is further stated in Fletcher, 
supra, sec. 801, p. 38, "if notice to or knowledge of a 
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corporate officer is such as to be imputable to the corporation, 
the subsequent death, discharge, removal, termination of 
office or the like, without any actual communication of 
the information to the corporation, does not affect the force 
of the imputation of notice." (Emphasis added.) 
In a case involving the issue of whether a 
corporation was deemed to have imputed knowledge of the 
contents of a contract for the purchase of mining cars, 
the courtof Appeals of Kentucky held that the corporation 
was deemed to have the knowledge of the corporate officer 
who signed the contract. Enterprise Foundry & Mach. Works 
v. Miner's Elkhorn coal Co., 241 Ky. 779, 45 S.W.2d 470 (1931). 
Appellant contends that in the instant case, where 
two officers of respondent signed the 1968 agreement, 
respondent should be deemed to have had knowledge of the 
existence and contents of the 1968 agreement in February of 
1978. Respondent must have retained a copy of the 1968 
agreement, as it was respondent who produced the agreement at 
the hearing on appellant's motion for summary judgment. 
This Court should not permit one party to a contract to avoid 
searching its files and exercising reasonable diligence in 
ascertaining facts pertinent to the contract under negotiation. 
The notion of imputation of knowledge is sound and, in the 
instant case, prevents respondent from asserting a lack of 
knowledge of the existence of the 1968 agreement. The findings 
of fact and conslusions of law of the trial court on this 
point must be reversed. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF 
PROVING THAT TRADE SECRETS ARE INVOLVED 
IN THE MANUFACTURE OF THE TEST KITS. 
While respondent has never alleged in any precise 
manner the items or processes which it considers to be trade 
secrets and findings of fact and conclusions of law entered 
by the trial court are unclear on this point, appellant 
believes that the following is a comprehensive list of all 
possible items or processes which respondent may claim to 
be trade secrets: 
ANA and HERPES KITS: 
(1) the use of "FL" or "AV-3" human amnion cell 
lines; 
(2) the addition of tryptose phosphate broth, 
Hepes buffer and/or Lactalbumen Hydrolysate to the minimum 
essential media (MEM) ; 
(3) the use of isopropyl alcohol as a fixative; 
(4) rinsing the slides three times with a 
solution containing sodium bicarbonate; 
(5) the use of large Pyrex plates, tape and 
Saran wrap in processing the slides. 
TOXOPLASMOSIS KIT: 
(6) the use of "Tween 80" as a deterring agent on 
the slides. 
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ALL KITS: 
(7) customer lists for all kits. 
The definition of "trade secret" found in Section 757
1 
comment b of Restatement, Torts (1939), has been widely 
accepted by courts dealing with the problem of trade secrets: 
A trade secret may consist of any 
fo;mula, pattern, device or compilation 
of information which is used in one's 
business, and which gives him an opportunity 
to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it .•• 
· An exact definition of a trade secret 
is not possible. Some factors to be 
considered in determining whether given 
information is one's trade secret are: 
(1) the extent to which the information 
is known outside of his business; (2) 
the extent to which it is known by 
employees and others involved in his 
business; (3) the extent of measures 
taken by him to guard the secrecy of 
the information; (4) the value of the 
information to him and to his competitors; 
(5) the amount of effort or money expended 
by him in developing the information; 
(6) the ease or difficulty with which 
the information could be properly 
acquired or duplicated by others. 
Appellant contends that an application of the 
Restatement definition and determinative factors to the 
seven items and processes listed above and discussed below 
reveals that none of the "secrets" is, in fact, deserving 
of protection as a trade secret. 
ANA and HERPES KITS 
(1) the use of "FL" or "AV-3" human amnion cell lin~--
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The use of these particular cell lines as a trade secret 
cannot withstand the application of any one of the six 
factors. The FL and AV-3 cell lines are known to microbiologists 
both within and outside of the business of producing disease 
test kits. Dr. Leibovitz testified that he had grown FL 
cells previously and was familiar with the AV-3 line (T.80-81). 
Appellant testified that, in fact, the FL line had been used 
by MRC only after it had lost its own original cell line 
in 1974, (T.203-06), and that monkey cells work as well as 
human cells as a substrate (T.211). In 1970, Kenneth Hayami 
Kato published a thesis for his Master of Science Degree in 
which he concluded that human, mouse, monkey and chicken cells 
all produced the desired results sought in the immunofluorescent 
process (Defendant's Exhibit 2). 
THe FL and AV-3 lines are not guarded by respondent 
as secrets; they have comparatively little value, per se, 
to respondent; MRC expended no effort or money in developing 
the lines; respondent's competitors could, and in all 
likelihood do, purchase these lines for their production 
processes. In short, respondent obtains no competitive 
advantage from the use of FL and AV-3 cell lines because 
they are equally available on a commercial basis to competitors. 
(2) the addition of tryptos phosphate broth, Hepes 
buffer and/or Lactalburnen Hydrolysate to the minimum essential 
media (MEM)--This particular procedure must fall short of 
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trade secret status because even respondent cannot claim to 
know the significance, if any, of the addition of some or all 
of the three supplements to the dedia. Respondent's own 
witness characterized the effect of the additives and their 
role as "black magic". (T.83). Testimony was also elicited 
that established the existence of other means of growing 
cells in a media that were as good as respondent's method. 
(T.85). The use of these additives is common knowledge 
among microbiologists who seek to grow cells in a media. 
The use of these additives is no more a trade secret than 
a gardener's choice of a particular fertilizer to apply to 
his lawn. 
(3) the use of isopropyl alcohol as a fixative--
This procedure affords respondent no commercial advantage and 
is merely a choice of one of several equally effective 
alternatives. Respondent's witnesses established the 
acceptance within the scientific community of isopropyl 
alcohol as a fixative and testified that propanol, methanol, 
ethyl alcohol and acetone are also equally effective 
fixatives. (T.88, 118). Applying the Restatement factors 
supports the conclusion that respondent derives no unusual 
value or benefit from the use of isopropyl alcohol and that 
respondent's competitors are aware of the procedure even if 
they do not already use it. 
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(4) rinsing the slides three times with a solution 
containing sodium bicarbonate--The use of bicarbonate is 
another example of a procedure whose significance is unknown 
to respondent. Dr. Leibovitz testified that he did not know 
if the sodium bicarbonate did anything. (T.87). Dr. Golden 
also could not testify to any beneficial effect of the 
sodium bicarbonate. (T.125). Appellant maintains that 
respondent's process is essentially a very simple one, known 
and understood by microbiologists in general, which has 
been clouded by purported complexity. The presence of 
"black magic" additives and unexplained elements does not 
change a fundamentally simple process. If respondent's logic 
is expanded, one of two unsupportable results obtains: 
(a) a legitimate secret formula can become a second "secret" 
formula by the addition of one unexplained and possibly non-
functional element; or (b) any combination of unexplained 
and possibly non-functional components can be a "secret" 
formula. Such is not the law of trade secrets. 
Respondent also maintains that rinsing the slides three 
times (as opposed to one, two, four, five or any other number 
of times) is a trade secret. The purpose of rinsing the slides 
is to cleanse them, and common knowledge dictates that the 
more times something is cleansed, the cleaner it becomes. 
Trial testimony further emphasized this obvious conclusion. 
(T.88-89). Appellant submits that the three rinses are 
indicative of the care taken in the production of the slides 
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and not a part of any secret process. care taken in the 
production of an item does not warrant protection as a 
proprietary interest. 
(5) the use of large Pyrex plates, tape and Saran wrap 
in processing the slides--A basic element in a trade secret 
in an employer-employee relationship is that the secret must 
have been disclosed, evolved or discovered after the 
employee began to work for the employer. An employee's 
knowledge, skill and experience which he brings with him to 
the employment relationship remain his after the relationship 
ends. Tempo Instrument Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F.Supp. 1 
(E.D.N.Y. 1964). Appellant testified that he was taught to 
use the technique utilizing Pyrex plates, tape and Saran wrap 
by a Dr. Hale at the University of Utah Virology Department 
prior to going to work for respondent in 1968. Moreover, 
each student in Dr. Hale's class was instructed in the 
technique. This procedure can hardly be termed secret. It 
should also be noted that Douglas w. Hill, Ph.D., used this 
exact same procedure as early as 1964 while doing tissue 
culture work for the Army at the university of Utah. It has 
been published in several reports, disclosed in at least 
two theses and is therefore part of the public domain. (R.115). 
Dr. Golden testified that this technique was an 
efficient way to process large numbers of slides, but 
that other methods of accomplishing that goal are available, 
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e.g., a plastic stacking device (T.120). If respondent's 
competitors can obtain the same level of efficiency by 
alternate means, respondnet cannot claim that the technique 
that it learned from appellant is proprietary. To deprive 
appellant of the use of this procedure would be to impose 
a forfeiture of knowledge that was in no way gained from 
his employment with respondent. 
TOXOPLASMOSIS KITS 
(6) the use of "Tween 80" as a deterring agent 
on the slides--Dr. Golden testified that respondent's procedure 
in manufacturing the toxoplasmosis kits is "similar to that 
recommended by the Center for Disease control except for 
our purposes, we incorporate a deterring agent, Tween 80, 
T-w-e-e-n 80, into the suspending fluid to keep the toxo 
from settling to the edges of this little well on the slide." 
(T.108). She went on to acknowledge that, despite the fact 
that her job with respondent was her first experience with 
commercial laboratories, she was aware that a Dr. Jack 
Rernrnington, a "world authority on toxoplasmosis (T.20), also 
used Tween 80. (T.126). Appellant testified that Hoffman-
LeRoach company used Tween 80 as well (T.216). The properties 
of Tween 80 as a deterring agent are known to the scientific 
community and its use by respondent is incidental to the 
basic immunoflourescent process. Because of its incidental 
nature, the use of Tween 80 is of relatively little value to 
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respondent or its competitors; therefore, it is not deserving 
of protection as a trade secret under the Restatement test, 
supra. 
ALL KITS 
(7) customer lists--The only evidence concerning 
the alleged proprietary nature of a customer list is found 
in the deposition of Edward J. Mawod. Mr. Mawod testified 
that such a list does exist, and that it was compiled from 
sources including referrals from existing customers, 
inquiries from journal advertisements, state health 
institutions and lists obtained from the federal customs 
department (Deposition of Edward J. ~awod 46, 48, 51). Mr. 
Mawod also testified that appellant had suggested names to be 
contacted and placed on the list (Deposition of Edward J. Mawod 
49). The overwhelming majority of customers on the list 
were laboratories and hospitals, both of which are readily 
accessible in telephone books, trade journals or other 
public sources. Mr. Mawod estimated the number of customers 
at three hundred (Deposition of Edward J. Mawod 46), which is 
not an unusually large number of customers for a business 
selling products on a worldwide basis. Appellant contends 
that respondent has not shown the requisite elements for 
establishing a proprietary interest in the customer list. 
Most notably, respondent expended very little effort and 
' money in developing the list and made no attempt to keep 
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the list secret until Mr. Mawod took over as president of 
respondent (T. 65). Because of respondent's failure to carry 
his burden on this issue, appellant should be permitted to 
contact any potential customers of his choosing. 
Several general points concerning respondent's 
overall production of test kits and claimed trade secrets 
must be emphasized. Most importantly, respondent failed to 
rigorously maintain a high level of secrecy as set forth in 
the Restatement and as required by the subsequent case law. 
First, respondent did not institute security procedures at 
the lab until relatively late in appellant's tenure of 
employment. Appellant started to work in 1968, yet 
non-competition clauses in employee's contracts were not 
required until 1974 and then only because non-technical 
members of management requested that such contracts be used 
(T. 27). The locked, fire-proof file, visitor logbook and 
visitor non-disclosure forms were all implemented by Mr. 
Mawod only after he became president of respondent in 
1978 (T. 65). Respondent is apparently. attempting to assert 
that, even though Mr. Mawod is not qualified to testify 
about the technical, unique or secret aspects of the test 
kits (T. 58), his actions in attempting to protect certain 
information renders this information secret and/or proprietary. 
Second, all of respondent's claimed secrets have been revealed 
in the literature of the scientific conununity. Dr. 
Stanley Marcus was asked this question: 
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"Dr. Marcus, in your opinion is there 
anything that is not published in the literature 
or not generally known to a competent 
microbiologist that he would need to know 
in order to~manufacture either an ANA test 
kit, and a Herpes, or a Toxoplasmosis 
kit in a commercial quantity?" 
A. No. 
(T. 239). 
Appellant also testified: 
"In my opinion, everything that MRC 
or any other manufacturer has in the 
biological field, is found in the 
literature. If you don't believe me, 
take a look at the references they put to 
document their work and you can open 
a whole door of references as to where 
all this information has come from. 
(T. 216). 
In addition to articles by other authors on the 
subject, appellant himself had published an article in 
1966 detailing the procedure, parameters and methodology 
of immunofluorescence and the production of test slides 
(T. 199). Defendant's Exhibits 2, 3 and 5 were also 
documents providing information on the process at issue 
(T. 209-10, 215) • 
A fitting description of the futility of belated 
efforts aimed at establishing secrecy is found in 12 Business 
Organizations,MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS, Sec. 2.03, p. 2-25: 
But whether secrecy is lost through 
seepage in conduct of business, sale or 
exposition of a product embodying the secret, 
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disclosure of the idea through a trade 
or technical publication, or by way of 
a patent, or by unprotected use in a 
foreign country, the principle remains: 
a secret on the wing cannot be recalled. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Respondent has failed to prove that any of the claimed 
proprietary interests are sufficiently secret to warrant 
protection. 
Respondent has also failed to establish that the 
claimed secrets are of value to it or its competitors. 
As has been shown, supra, several of the processes cannot 
be explained by respondent and others have readily available 
alternatives. Thus, the value element of the Restatement test 
is missing. Significantly, no showing has been made that 
respondent expended large amounts of money or effort in 
developing the process for making the test kits. As has been 
emphasized before, appellant possessed the skill, knowledge, 
experience and techniques needed to make the kits before he 
began working for respondent. Mr. Mawed merely afforded 
appellant an opportunity to continue using his skills, 
which, in turn, gave Mr. Mawed the opportunity to participate 
in a money-making enterprise. Respondent has not shown 
which, if any, new techniques or processes were unknown to 
appellant in 1968 and discovered only after he began his 
employment with respondent. Lastly, appellant has shown that 
the supposedly secret information could be easily duplicated 
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I 
by other competent microbiologists by simply using the 
published literature and independent research. In short, 
respondent has failed to meet the accepted criteria of the 
Restatement test and, therefore, no trade secrets can be 
established. 
Without burdening this Court with lengthy quotations, 
appellant invites the Court to consider an excellent 
discussion of the competing policy arguments involved in 
an employer-employee trade secret case, found in Wexler v. 
Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960). While Wexler 
did not involve an express covenant assigning the employee's 
discoveries to the employer, the reasoning the the Supreme 
court of Pennsylvania is applicable to the instant case 
because appellant contends that no novel discoveries were made 
by appellant after he began work for respondent. Appellant 
contends that, as the court found in Wexler, the policies 
in favor of economic mobility and personal freedom in 
pursuing a livelihood outweigh those supporting the furtherance 
of "investment in research" by private business. 
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POINT IV 
THE TWO-YEAR INJUNCTION IMPOSED UPON APPELLA.~T 
BY THE TRIAL COURT LACKS SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY 
AND UNREASONABLY RESTRAINS APPELL.AJ.~T FROM 
PURSUING A LIVELIHOOD. 
The memorandum decision entered by the trial court 
on August 16, 1979, states, 
THE DEFENDANT is further enjoined and restrained 
from competing with plaintiff in any of it's 
(sic) product lines for a period of two (2) 
years from date of entry of this Judgment. 
(R. 190) 
The Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court state at 
paragraph 4: 
That defendant should be restrained for 
a period of two years from the entry of this 
judgment from competing with the plaintiff 
in plaintiff's present product lines towit 
Antinuclear Binding Antibody kits and all 
of its components, toxoplasmosis kit and 
all of its components, infectious mono-
nucleosis kit and all of its components, 
Herpes 1 and 2 kit and all of its components. 
Neither of these statements by the trial court 
provides sufficient information to enable appellant to 
determine (1) what specific trade secrets were found by the 
trial court; (2) what types of employment would be considered 
"competing" with respondent; (3) what geographic area was 
contemplated by the trial court; and (4) the precise meaning 
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of "all of its components". A strict interpretation of the 
final restraining order would seem to prevent appellant from 
producing a test kit using any process, even though the 
process utilized might be completely different than 
respondent's claimed secret process. A liberal reading of 
the order would appear to prohibit appellant from being 
employed as a microbiologist in any capacity if it would 
involve the growth of cells, the use of slides or the 
use of certain chemicals, all of which are components of 
respondent's kits. 
Without conceding that a restraining order is 
justified at all in the instant case, appellant submits that 
the order must at least be specific in defining the acts 
which it seeks to prohibit. If appellant is to be restrained 
from utilizing the exact procedure used by respondent in 
making a certain kit, the order should so state. Certainly 
an order preventing appellant from using skills and 
techniques which he possessed prior to his emp.loyment with 
respondent is unjustified. Appellant further asserts that 
an order prohibiting him from making test kits without what 
this Court may find are, in fact, trade secrets, would be 
unreasonable. Appellant should not be placed in economic 
bondage by an overly broad, vague restraining order. 
Rule 65A(d} of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
sets forth clear guidelines for the form and scope of an 
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injunction or restraining order: 
Every order granting an injunction and every 
restraining order shall be specific in terms; 
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not 
by reference to the complaint or other 
document, the act or acts sought to be 
restrained; and is binding only upon the 
parties to the action, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon 
those persons in active concert or participa-
tion with them who receive actual notice of 
the order by personal service or otherwise. 
Appellant submits that the order entered by the 
trial court does not comply with Rule 65A(d), U.R.C.P. An 
overly broad restraining order may be modified by an 
appellate court. E. W. Bliss Company v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 
408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969). It is further submitted that 
where, as in the instant case the trial court apparently 
has not determined what the trade secrets are, a modification 
of the restraining order cannot be intelligently made. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Edward J. Mawod has been associated with 
respondent since its creation. He acted as its executive 
director from 1974 until 1977 and was on the board of directors 
for several years during the corporation's existence. He knew 
appellant personally and was put on notice of appellant's 
intentions if Mr. Mawod became corporate president. Mr. 
Mawod, when he became president, had a fiduciary duty to 
respondent which required him to act in respondent's best 
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interest. 
Despite these facts, Mr. Mawod, on behalf of the 
respondent, executed the 1978 employment agreement which 
contained no restrictions on appellant should he leave 
respondent's employ. Respondent preparted the agreement and 
could have included any non-competition provisions it desired. 
Instead, respondent elected to release appellant from any 
previous restrictions and to not impose new non-competition 
restraints. A more clear, unambiguous or precise written 
statement of respondent's intentions is inconceivable. 
Mr. Mawod contends, however, that he did not know of 
the 1968 agreement and that he did not discover it until 
after appellant's employment was terminated. This contention 
is without merit for two reasons. Mr. Mawod, as corporate 
president, had all corporate files available to him and an 
examination of the records would have revealed the 1968 
agreement. Not only did he fail to make such an examination, 
he expressly, on behalf of respondent, revoked and cancelled 
any and all prior agreements by the language used in the 1978 
agreement. The only logical conclusion is that this revocation 
included all lost, stolen, burned, misplaced, forgotten or 
destroyed written or oral agreements. 
Prior to 1968 appellant put a substantial amount of 
effort into developing a process whereby immunofluorescence 
could be used to rapidly and accurately detect diseases in 
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human beings. He had successfully used this technique to 
detect lupus erythematosus, a devastating disease affecting 
primarily women during their child bearing years. In 1966 
he published a paper disclosing to the medical community how 
to make and use this test. The immunofluorescence technique 
had proven useful in detecting Herpes virus and in 1967 
and 1968 appellant began to work toward creating a test for 
the earlier detection of cancer. 
Mr. Mawod and the other promoters involved in 
the establishment of the respondent corporation offered 
appellant funding to continue this effort. When the funding 
did not materialize, appellant took what was and is common 
knowledge in the tissue culture field, combined this with 
his earlier immunofluorcscsnce work and employed the 
University of Utah's Pyrex baking dish procedure to 
commercially market test kits. 
The uncontroverted testimony in this case clearly 
shows that every procedure employed by respondent in 
manufacturing its kits is in the public domain. The Center 
for Disease Control publishes the step by step procedure 
for the toxoplasmosis kit, appellant has publicized the 
ANA information which is equally applicable to the Herpes 
kit and numerous competitors market kits which work as well 
or better than respondent's. The early detection of diseases 
allows for more successful treatment and competition as well 
-47-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as the free exchange of information among medical supply 
manufacturers and should be encouraged. 
To overcome the foregoing facts respondent relies 
on the testimony of two microbiologists. Neither of these 
scientists have any idea whatsoever how respondent's 
competitors manufacture their kits and in fact, cannot say 
that the competitors do not use the same equipment and 
formulas as respondent. Their testimony merely establishes 
that they have never before observed certain techniques 
and formulas which respondent uses. Not only are they 
unfamiliar with respondent's formulas, they have no idea 
what effect the ingredients have on the product. It is 
submitted that this type of testimony is totally insufficient 
to overcome the evidence that each and every method and 
formula used by respondent is either in the public domain 
or was used by appellant and numerous other scientists 
long before respondent. 
STE EN D. LUSTER 
{lifs~JJi£L 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A: 
... ~.,';;;/ ''J '''.''"ER EMPLOYMENT AGREEMEN'i· • · · .. ·~" - . L.1;,," 
. :. -::·.:~··1. Utah 
THIS AGREEMENT, made this ;i.~· ".!'/.. day of February, 1978, 
between MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATION, a corporation, 
herein called "Micro", and N. M. MUNA, Ph.D., herein called 
"Muna", 
WITNESSETH: 
1. All previous employment agreements and under-
standings in connection therewith are hereby mutually terminated 
and settled. 
2. Commencing on the date first written above, Micro 
employs Muna and Muna accepts such employment upon the terms and 
conditions herein set forth. 
3. Muna agrees to act as a consultant and research 
microbiologist for Micro upon such problems and projects as the 
management of Micro shall specify, and shall be Dir. of Labs. (CDC) 
4. Micro shall pay to Muna the sum of $17.00 per hour, 
payable semi-mo~thly, for such consulting and research work. 
When not engaged in consulting work, Muna saall pursue the 
designated research projects and shall devote as much time to 
said employment as his health permits, but not to exceed 40 hours 
per week, without prior written permission. 
5. Muna shall be entitled to vacations, sick-leave, 
and medical insurance coverage as though he were a full-~ime 
employee. 
6. During the term of this agreement Muna shall not 
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- 2 -
act as consultant for, or accept employment from any competitor 
of Micro nor shall he compete directly or indirectly with Micro. 
7. Micro shall be the owner of all the research data, 
ideas and material ,discovered or developed at Micro by Muna 
- I ,,.\ ?'/ Jr]. during the term hereof. {,. .,,,,, . '2- i, 111 J)~ 
8. This agreement shall continue in effect unless 
terminated by thirty days advance written notice of either party. 
MICROBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH CORPORATIO! 
:M. MUNA, Ph.D. 
Appendix 
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APPENDIX "B" 
(Appendix "B" has been reproducted on letter size paper instead 
of its original legal size to correspond to the size of the 
pages of this brief.) 
MANAGEMENT CONTRACT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this~ day of 
September, 1968, by and between DR. NADEEM M. MUNA, hereinafter referred 
to as "Muna", and MICROBIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, INC., a Utah corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as "Company"; 
WITNESSETH: 
FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual covenants herein con-
tained, the parties hereto mutually agree as follows: 
1. The Company hereby employs Muna as its President and 
General Manager for a period of five (5) years from the date hereof, 
and thereafter, from year to year, unless terminated by either party 
hereto by written notice at least sixty (60) days prior to any anniversary 
date of this Agreement. 
2. During the term hereof, Muna agrees to and shall devote 
his full time and efforts to the customary duties of a president and 
8'!neral manager for the benefit of the Company. 
3. Any and all developments, processes, inventions, and/or 
procedures developed, invented or processed by Muna during the term of 
this agreement shall belong to and be the sole and absolute property 
of the Compnny. 
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4. The Company shall pay Muna a basic salary of Twelve Thou~ 
Dollars ($12, 000. 00) per annum, payable in equal monthly installments, i 
for all services to be rendered by Muna for the Company. The Company I 
I 
shall also reimburse Muna for all expenses incurred by him in furtheran~ 
of the business of the Company, approved by the Board of Directors of I 
I 
the Company. ! 
S. Muna agrees that the Company may, from time to time, applj 
for and take out ~n its own name and at its own expense life, health, 
accident, or other insurance upon Muna that the Company may deem neces~l 
or advisable to protect its interests hereunder; and Muna agrees to 
submit to any medical or other examination necessary for such purpose a 
to assist and cooperate with the Company in procuring such insurance; 
and Muna agrees that he shall have no right, title or interest in and 
to such insurance. 
6. Muna agrees that during the terms of this Agreement he 
will not engage in any other commercial activity in any way competitive 
with the business of the Company, or its affiliated companies, and that,. 
I 
for a period of five (S) years after leaving the employ of the Company, i' 
he will not engage in any way, directly or indirectly, in any business 
competitive with the Company or its affiliated companies any any state 
in which any of them do business. Muna further agrees that he will not 
disclose to any other person any information which is the property of 
the Company or its affiliated companies. 
7. This Agreement shall cease and terminate if the Company 
shall discontinue its business, and all rights and liabilities hereunder 
shall cease. 
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B. The Company shall have a right to assign this contract 
to its successors or assigns and all covenants and agreements hereunder 
shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by or against its said 
successors or assigns. The term "successor and assign" shall include 
any corporation which buys all or substantially all of the Company's 
assets, or all of its stock, or with which it merges or consolidates. 
9. Any waiver by either party of a breach of any provision 
of this Agreement shall not operate as or be construed as a waiver of 
any subsequent breach thereof. 
10. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement is executed the day and year 
first hereinabove written. 
ATTEST: 
secreta'(j' 
..., 
MICROBIOLOGICAL SCIENCES, INC. 
Dr. Nadeem M. Muna 
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